We develop a model of Schumpeterian growth where political connections with long-term politicians can be exploited by low-quality producers to defend their monopoly position and prevent innovation and entry of high-quality competitors. Through personal relationship developed with the incumbent politicians, connected …rms are able to reduce bureaucratic costs that are set by the politicians in order to a¤ect their chances of re-election. We focus on the stationary Markov perfect equilibria that are generated by the strategic interaction between politicians, …rms and voters and show the dependence of the equilibrium on technological and political parameters. Under certain con…gurations, a political equilibrium arises where the politician secures re-election by setting high bureaucratic costs and …rms invest in network blocking innovation and entry. Though ine¢ cient, this equilibrium is supported by voters who prefer the status quo. Thus, the model provides a possible explanation for technological inertia and the persistence of ine¢ cient democracies where these re ‡ect shared rather than con ‡icting interests.
Introduction
In several countries the existence of long-lived political and economic elites is often blamed for the low rate of technological innovation, economic growth and social mobility. Politicians and major economic actors are perceived as an inaccessible and self-su¢ cient core that rules the country by means of long-lasting personal relations, contacts and acquaintances, preventing access to power by more dynamic (and young) individuals and creating a relationship-based system where economic outcomes tend to be driven by "knowing the right person in the right place"more than by the market. This relationship-based system is likely to oppose technological innovation, especially when innovation implies radical changes in the status quo and destruction of incumbent (political and economic) rents.
To capture how connections between politicians and …rms can explain political persistence and hinder economic growth, in this paper we use a simple dynamic model of growth with quality improvements à la Aghion and Howitt [5] . In the intermediate good sector, the leading-edge quality is exogenously available in each period and is used by …nal-good producers to generate output. Firms in the intermediate good sector engage in Bertrand price competition and the quality leader employs a limit-pricing strategy to make it unpro…table for the next best quality to be produced. A signi…cant departure from this literature comes from the political side of the model. We assume that production costs are a¤ected by the extent of red tape and bureaucracy which is strategically chosen by the politician in o¢ ce at the beginning of each period, seeking re-election. The incumbent monopolist chooses whether to invest in a network with the incumbent politician or to invest in the adoption of a more advanced technology. Investment in network allows the …rm to reduce the production costs of the current vintage and pays o¤ provided that the incumbent politician is con…rmed in o¢ ce. Although the connected …rm faces competition from outsiders that may enter the market with a leading-edge technology, it might succeed in keeping competitors out of the market as the latter cannot bene…t from cost reductions generated by the network with the politician.
Focusing on the stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria of an in…nitely-repeated dynamic game, we show that the strategic interaction between politician, monopolist and voters (that is, workers) yields two possible equilibrium outcomes, depending on structural parameters. In the "bad" equilibrium, which emerges when quality improvements are low, the politician introduces distortionary red-tape costs, the monopolist invests in network and the economy is locked in a stagnant equilibrium with no innovation and no growth.
The incumbent politician never loses elections and the incumbent monopolist never loses its market. When quality improvements are large the "good" equilibrium arises, where red tape costs are negligible, new technologies are always adopted and there is sustained growth. Moreover, there is turnover of politicians and …rms.
Rather than being imposed on the society by the political-economic elite (as, for instance, in Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni [3] ), our "bad" equilibrium, where the level of bureaucracy is ine¢ ciently high and innovation is low, is supported by voters who value the static gains of cost reductions delivered by the political network more than the dynamic loss of blocked innovation. Although new and more advanced technology is freely available, all economic agents prefer to keep the status quo and the current technology in order to exploit the advantages of the network in the presence of high bureaucratic costs. 1 Our model describes a world in which ine¢ cient democracies are particularly di¢ cult to reform and persist over time as they re ‡ect shared rather than con ‡icting interests.
By moving …rst, politicians have the opportunity to gain political support for an inef…cient policy which is a (welfare reducing) second-best policy but increases chances of re-election. When called upon to decide in a democratic way whether to con…rm the incumbent politician or not, voters choose the "ine¢ cient" incumbent. This strategic interpretation of the use of bureaucracy to gain electoral advantage is reminiscent of the one put forward by Golden [16] in a political-science analysis of postwar Italian politics, "bureaucratic ine¢ ciency, excessive legislation and widespread bureaucratic corruption were features of Italian public administration that were deliberately designed by legislators and intended to enhance re-election prospects for incumbents [our italics] by providing them with opportunities for extensive constituency service" (p. 189).
Our framework allows to solve for the equilibrium level of red-tape costs and to study how the Markov equilibrium depends on the structural parameters of our economy. Specifically, the "bad" equilibrium is more likely to emerge the higher is the responsiveness of voters to economic policies and the lower is the probability that the incumbent …rm is successful in innovation, which we interpret as a proxy for economic competition in the intermediate sector. However, when economic competition increases, the equilibrium level of ine¢ cient bureaucracy, which is chosen by the politician to increase the chances of remaining in power, decreases.
These results yield some interesting political economy implications. On the one hand, when responsiveness of voters is low, the good equilibrium can arise even in cases where 1 Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni [3] provide a di¤erent explanation for the emergence and persistence of ine¢ cient states based on the strategic use of patronage politics by the elite of the rich who try to limit provision of public goods and redistribution.
voters would support the bad equilibrium since, once bureaucratic costs are in place, they are better o¤ by supporting the network between the politician and the …rm. However, in this situation the incumbent politician internalizes the cost of bureaucracy and prefers to implement the …rst best. On the other hand, when responsiveness of voters is high, the good equilibrium emerges even in cases where the politician would rather set high bureaucratic costs and prevent innovation. Political accountability through elections is a credible threat which induces the politician to reform bureaucracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some motivating evidence and discusses the related literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model and Section 4 analyzes the politico-economic equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating evidence and related literature
Motivating evidence
Before looking at data, it is worth summarizing here the main predictions of the theory that we full develop in the next section. Depending on structural parameters, the economy ends up in one of the two possible equilibria: one in which red-tape costs are high, innovation is small, growth rate is small and political persistence is negatively related with growth.
The other type of equilibrium is characterized by low red-tape costs, high innovation, high growth and no relationship between political persistence and growth. 2 Far from proposing a structural estimation of the full model, we rather test whether an important theoretical …nding is consistent with data: in a simpli…ed version of the model, in which red-tape costs are given, political persistence is negatively correlated with growth in high cost countries while it is not correlated in low cost ones.
As it is well known, there are large cross-country di¤erences in the extent and e¢ ciency of bureaucracy, even considering democratic countries at similar levels of development.
According to Doing Business 2009, dealing with licenses (in the construction industry) takes on average 257 days in Italy and 40 days in the US, with a cost of 136.4% of income per capita in Italy and 13.1% in the US. Starting a business requires a cost of 18.5% of income per capita in Italy compared to only 0.7% in the US. 2 According to the theoretical framework developed in the Introduction, as political connections are lost when the incumbent politician is removed from o¢ ce, low turnover of politicians should be associated to low growth in heavily regulated economies (e.g. Italy), as political persistence implies the perpetuation of the network and the blocking of innovation in these countries, while it would be less relevant for growth in countries where regulation is low (e.g. the US).
Using information from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), we measure political persistence (PERS ) as the percentage of main political entities ("veto players") who remain in place in the government in any given year, relative to the previous one. 3 In line with our theoretical framework, we restrict our investigation to democracies, and focus on political turnover that takes place through democratic institutions. 4 We use the index of Bureaucratic Quality (BQ) constructed in the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as a proxy for red-tape costs. 5 We consider a country having high (low) red-tape costs if the value of BQ in 1984 (the …rst available observation for most countries) is below (above) 3.5 (the OECD average is 3.56). 6 Even if the within-country variability of BQ is very low, in one speci…cation we exploit it to evaluate the pure correlation of BQ on growth. The growth rate (GROWTH ) is de…ned as the annual per capita GDP growth rate at constant 2005 PPP USD, from World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).
The equation we estimate is the following:
where i denotes country, t the time period, P ERS it 1 is lagged persistence,
is a dummy that takes value 1 if country i is low (high) cost and X it is a vector of controls that includes a full set of time and country …xed e¤ects. 7 Controls in X it include the initial (log of) GDP per capita as well as standard controls used in growth regressions, such 3 Veto players are de…ned as the chief executive (counted twice if she's competitively elected) and the opposition if it controls the legislature. In addition, each chamber (unless the chief executive controls the lower house through a closed list system) and each of the party allied with the president is a veto player in presidential systems. In parliamentary systems, veto players are those parties that are necessary for the winning coalition to keep the absolute majority in the government and those parties in the government coalition that are ideologically nearer to opposition parties. It is worth emphasizing that, di¤erently from widely used de…nitions of political stability, our measure captures political changes not only in electoral years but also during the legislature. 4 According to DPI, country i is de…ned democratic in year t if legislative and executive competitiveness both take their maximum value in country i in year t. 5 The BQ index takes values between 0 and 4, with 0 denoting lowest quality. This variable captures one determinant of red-tape costs, that is a weak and ine¢ cient bureaucracy. We prefer this measure to alternative proxies of red-tape costs -such as measures of government e¤ectiveness from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufman et al. [18] ) and indicators of the cost of setting up and operating a business (Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations [21] )-since it is available for a longer time span. 6 We also tried di¤erent thresholds to classify countries into high and low cost, with threshold values ranging between 3.1 and 3.9. None of the results presented here substantially changed. 7 In the speci…cation that exploits the time variability of BQ there will be Lit 1 and As a further check, we deal with possible sources of bias due to omitted variables and endogeneity. In particular, the inclusion of initial (log of) GDP level and the potential endogeneity of the variable PERS could lead to biased estimations. To tackle these issues, 8 In order to alleviate estimation bias due to measurement error and reverse causation, all these controls are taken at the beginning of each period, with the exception of EDU which is the average over the current and previous 5-year periods. 9 In the speci…cation in which the low/high cost status varies over time, we attribute the value of BQ we rely on a 2SLS estimator. Since we instrument initial GDP with its lagged value, in order not to lose too many observations we turn to yearly data and rede…ne PERS as the three-year moving average of yearly persistence, so to smooth out short term variability.
To minimize missing information, we include all yearly data for countries that show an average degree of democracy over the sample period higher than 0.7, where country i in year t receives value 1 if democratic or 0 if not democratic. As before, we classify a country as having high (low) red-tape costs and set
(that is the value of BQ in 1984 or the …rst available observation) is below (above) 3:5.
Our new sample includes 55 countries. 11 Using additional data from DPI, we construct two variables that will be used as instruments for PERS. The …rst is a dummy variable, LAG_LEG, taking value one (zero)
when legislative elections took (did not take) place in the previous year. The second variable, PAST_EL, counts the number of years since the last legislative or executive election. As the empirical literature on political business cycles …nds no evidence of a systematic association between growth and election dates, we expect the timing of elections to be uncorrelated with growth. Instead, we expect LAG_LEG to be positively related and PAST_EL to be negatively related with PERS. As most changes in veto players take place in elections years, persistence should be high in the subsequent year. Instead, the longer the time span between the last election and the year in which persistence is measured, the more likely that some veto players have changed.
Thanks to the increased number of observations, we can include country-speci…c time trends among the controls, so to capture within-country long term dynamics. On the contrary, we can only add as control the share of government expenditure on GDP, as other controls are scattered or collected on a …ve-year basis. Coe¢ cients of our variables of interest are reported in Column (5) of Table 1 and again the di¤erential results for PERS are still in place, even if not statistically distinguishable at standard con…dence level.
To summarize, our empirical analysis provides evidence that political persistence is negatively associated with growth in high red-tape costs countries, while we …nd no evidence of a relationship between persistence and growth in low costs countries. This result provides motivation for the theoretical analysis that we will develop in the following section. 
Related literature
Besides contributions already cited in the Introduction, our paper is related to several Third, recent empirical contributions investigate the relevance of political connections on …rms'performance. From a cross-country perspective, Faccio [12] documents the widespread existence of political connections and that these connections signi…cantly add to company values. Faccio et al. [13] …nd that politically-connected …rms are signi…cantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected …rms. More importantly for our contribution, in a recent paper Desai and Olofsgard [11] investigate the consequences of political connections on about 10.0000 …rms surveyed in 40 developing countries and …nd that in ‡uential …rms face fewer administrative and regulatory burdens and invest and innovate less.
Finally, our empirical results are related to the existing literature on political instability and economic growth. Almost all contributions use data on revolutions, coups and assassinations to construct a measure of political instability (see, for instance Alesina et al. [6] and the survey of the literature in Carmignani [10] ). Not surprisingly, these studies …nd a positive e¤ect of stability on growth. 12 On the contrary, our …ndings suggest that, when government change occurs through democratic institutions, political turnover (i.e. instability) rather than political persistence (i.e. stability) is positively associated with growth in countries where red-tape costs are high, while no robust correlation emerges when red-tape costs are low.
3 The model
The environment
Consider a two-sector economy populated by a continuous mass of in…nitely-lived agents.
Time is discrete with t = 0; 1; :::; 1: Utility is linear in consumption and future consumption is discounted at the subjective discount factor = 1=(1 + r) where r is the interest rate. This implies that, in each period, consumption is equal to income.
The intermediate good is produced using the …nal good by means of a one-to-one linear technology. At time 0 there exists an incumbent …rm which produces as a monopolist in the intermediate sector.
In each period t output in the …nal good sector is given by:
where L t is labor, e x t = P Qt q=0 q x q is a quality-adjusted intermediate input, with q denoting quality rung of intermediate good x q that has quality q : Q t denotes the highest quality level in use at time t. We will take the …nal good as numeraire and normalize its price to one. We assume no population growth and normalize L = 1. The …nal good sector is perfectly competitive.
To keep the economic side of the model simple and focus on the relationship between innovation, growth and political persistence, we abstract from endogenous innovation determined by R&D and from the potential catching up associated to distance to frontier.
Speci…cally, we assume that in each period exogenous technological progress makes a higher quality version of the intermediate good available. Technological upgrade is limited to the next higher quality good (step-by-step innovation). Thus, if technology Q is the highest quality adopted in the previous period, only technology Q + 1 can be adopted in the current period, although other superior technologies may be available. For reasons that will become clear later, technology adoption will be related to political outcomes.
At the beginning of period t; there is an incumbent monopolist who owns technology Q t 1 and an incumbent politician who was appointed at t 1. The incumbent politician sets the level of red-tape costs t 1 that are related to norms and regulations to carry out production in the intermediate good sector. Bureaucracy and excessive regulation impose external costs on …rms as information on bureaucratic requirements are costly to acquire and bureaucratic processes are time consuming. In our model, these costs will proportionally a¤ect marginal costs of production. Speci…cally, given our technology in the intermediate good sector, marginal cost of production is constant and equal to one.
Due to bureaucratic requirements, e¤ective production costs become equal to t . Note that we are assuming that, in order to a¤ect production in period t; the level of red-tape costs must be chosen at the beginning of the period. This assumption is meant to capture the idea that reforms of bureaucracy take time to be designed and implemented.
The incumbent monopolist and politician are potentially connected. We have in mind a system of personal relationships between the operating …rm and the politician in o¢ ce whereby the politician serves as facilitator by providing information on how to approach the bureaucracy or directly intervening in bureaucratic processes. By knowing the right person in the right place ("a rolodex e¤ect"), the …rm can more easily deal with bureaucratic requirements and acquires a competitive advantage over the outsiders.
We model the bene…t of being politically connected by assuming that connected …rms can enjoy lower marginal costs of production relative to unconnected …rms. Speci…cally, the marginal cost of production can be reduced to the minimum level equal to 1 for the connected …rm, if it exploits the network (thus acquiring a cost advantage t 1 over unconnected …rms). Notice that, if the politician sets t = 1; there is nothing to gain from a network with the politician.
In period t; in order to exploit the network advantage, two conditions must be satis…ed.
First, the incumbent politician must win period-t election and be re-elected. Second, the incumbent …rm must devote resources (in particular, spend time) to maintain its network.
In this case, the incumbent will face competition from an unconnected …rm with superior technology, but it might still be able to keep its monopoly by exploiting the network advantage. The alternative option for the incumbent …rm is to spend time to adopt the new technology. In this case, the existing network is lost and the …rm survives in the market (that is, it becomes the sole owner of the leading-edge technology) with probability . If the incumbent monopolist is unsuccessful, a new unconnected leader enters the market with probability one.
In other words, the incumbent …rm faces a trade-o¤ between "learning-by-knowing" and innovation. In the former case, the …rm exploits the repeated interaction and relationship with the politician to produce with the current technology at lower costs; in the latter case, the investment in innovation might lead the …rm to adopt the leading-edge technology and reach the technological frontier. Notice that the "learning-by-knowing" option is available only to the incumbent …rm and can be e¤ective only if the incumbent politician is con…rmed in o¢ ce. This captures the idea that it takes time to build relationships and makes the incumbent politician intrinsically di¤erent from the opponent in the eyes of economic agents. 13 According to a standard assumption in the literature on Schumpeterian models of growth (see Grossman and Helpman [17] ), in the intermediate good sector owners of di¤erent vintages compete à la Bertrand. Since intermediate inputs are perfect substitutes in the production of the …nal good, if all producers faced the same marginal costs of production t , the technological leader would become monopolist by setting a limit price
In this case, output would be given by:
and the monopolist would earn pro…ts equal to:
In our model, however, the incumbent producer, if politically connected, can prevent entry of more advanced but unconnected competitors by setting a limit price equal to p t = t = where t > 1 is the marginal cost of production of the competitor (recall that in this case the marginal cost for the incumbent is equal to 1). 14 Notice that the incumbent 1 3 Our description of the speci…c role of the incumbent politician in aiding …rms to deal with bureaucracy is reminiscent of political-science contributions on excessive bureaucracy in representative democracies. For instance, Fiorina and Noll [15] argue that "As the public bureaucracy grows larger, the importance of the performance of facilitation will grow, and a legislator who is a good facilitator will be increasingly likely to be reelected. ...Because part of facilitation is the possession and use of information which is acquired through experience, and because seniority enhances the in ‡uence of a legislator in determining the fate of an agency, incumbents can be more e¤ective facilitators than their challengers" (p. 257). 1 4 Limit pricing requires that < < 1= . The …rst inequality ensures that the connected …rm cannot …rm can make non-negative pro…ts at this price if and only if : 15 Output would be given by:
and pro…ts:
Remark 1 Given t ; aggregate income Y t is higher when the operating …rm is politically connected.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This preliminary result highlights an important feature of our economy. In any period, if bureaucratic costs are larger than the technological jump (that is, t > ), then the economy bene…ts from the network between the …rm and the politician as the former can produce at lower costs than the outside competitor. In this case, the potential bene…t from technological upgrade is not large enough to compensate for the cost reduction delivered by the network. Although the …rst best is reached when t = 1 and the network is useless (in this case Y t is maximum), once t has been set larger than , the (static) second best is reached through the network. As we will show in the next section, this result implies a crucial trade-o¤ for agents (workers in particular) who will decide whether to replace the incumbent politician or not by comparing the short-run gain of supporting the network with the long-run gains of technological upgrade.
Elections are held in each period and voters decide whether to con…rm the incumbent or replace her with the opponent. Voters choose politicians in order to maximize their lifetime utility. As workers represent the majority of the electorate, we will focus solely on their political preferences to determine electoral results. Speci…cally, we assume that, if keeping in o¢ ce the incumbent politician yields higher utility for workers than replacing her, the incumbent will be re-elected with probability one. If, instead, voters are indi¤erent between the economic outcomes delivered by the two candidates, the incumbent faces a probability of being re-elected equal to 2 (0; 1) which is related to non-economic bene…ts keep the leading-edge competitor out of the market by setting the monopoly price 1= : Similarly, the second inequality ensures that the technological leader cannot keep competitors out of the market by setting the monopoly price = : 1 5 If the latter inequality were not satis…ed, network advantage could never prevent entry of the technological leader and the incumbent …rm would always prefer to invest in innovation rather than networking.
Then, innovation would certainly occur. In the next section, we will show that the endogenously determined is indeed larger than :
and could be thought of a bias in favor (if larger than 1/2) or against (if smaller than 1/2) the incumbent. The electoral gain (1 ) can then be interpreted as a measure of the responsiveness of voters to economic policies. When (1 ) gets higher, voters become more responsive and the incumbent can capture more additional votes with an economic platform that provides higher utility for workers than the opponent's platform. 16 Taking into account the last two paragraphs, let us consider a one-period version of our model which will be useful to better understand the results of the following section.
When < ; the network is useless, the two candidates deliver exactly the same economic bene…ts to workers, and the probability of re-election for the incumbent is equal to .
When instead > , the incumbent politician guarantees higher economic bene…ts than the opponent and is re-elected with probability one. If the incumbent is re-elected, the connected …rm enjoys lower costs of production and can set a price = such that the outsider cannot enter the market, provided that this price is large enough to cover her own costs. On the contrary, if the opponent wins elections, the two …rms share the same cost , and the outsider wins the competition race by setting a price . Comparing the two cases, notice that the latter price is higher than the former even accounting for the quality upgrade, so that real wages are lower in the latter case. In the presence of high bureaucratic costs, although new and more advanced technology is freely available, workers might prefer to keep the status quo and the current technology in order to exploit the static advantages of the network.
The game
Each period t starts with technology Q t 1 inherited from period t 1. The timing of the events is the following. (1) At the beginning of period t, the incumbent politician sets red tape costs t 2 = [1; 1). (2) The incumbent …rm decides whether to invest in networking or innovation by choosing z t 2 Z = fN; Ig. (3) Elections are held and voters 1 6 We are assuming a simple voting model, where probability of politician i to be elected is equal to:
where j is the opponent politician, u w is the utility of workers (voters) and jt = 1 it: The model could be easily generalized to it = 1 > 0 > if u w it > u w jt : The simplifying assumption here is that it is a step function which will reduce the optimal choice of the politician to two possible levels of : In the Appendix we show how our voting model can be obtained using a probabilistic voting model à la Persson-Tabellini ( [20] , ch. 3).
(workers) decide whether to con…rm the incumbent in o¢ ce or replace her by choosing v t 2 V = fM; Rg where M denotes voting for the incumbent and R replacing her. (4) Production and consumption take place.
The history of the game in period t is a vector h t (t; Q 1 ; ::; Q t 1 ; 1 ::; t 1 ; z 1 ::; z t 1 ; v 1 ::; v t 1 )
The set of all possible history is denoted by H t . The future in period t is the sequence of future actions and states (t + 1; ::::; Q t ; ::::; t+1 ; ::::; z t+1 ; ::::::; v t+1 ; :::::). We denote by H(h t ; t ; z t ; v t ) the set of all possible histories h t+1 generated by h t ; t ; z t ; and v t : Finally, h 0 (0; Q 1 ) and time 0 begins with an incumbent politician and an incumbent …rm.
A strategy for the politician is a sequence of actions : H t ! which depends on history at time t. A strategy for the …rm is a sequence of actions z : H t x ! Z which depends on history and the action of the politician. Finally, a strategy for voters is a sequence of actions v : H t x x Z ! V which depends on history, the action of the politician and the choice of the …rm.
With history h t , the expected pay-o¤ for the politician of an action t is given by:
where E t is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t and and 0 otherwise. In other words, we assume that the politician is benevolent and cares about aggregate welfare provided that she remains in o¢ ce. 17 To simplify the analysis, we will assume that when is not re-elected, the politician no longer runs for o¢ ce.
The expected pay-o¤ for the …rm of an action z t is given by:
where t+s = 1 1
t+s (p t+s c t+s ) if the incumbent monopolist is still active at time t + s and 0 otherwise. Finally, the expected pay-o¤ for the voter of an action v t is given by:
where w t+s = (1
t+s denotes the wage rate at time t + s: 18 
The politico-economic equilibrium
We will now characterize the equilibrium of our in…nitely repeated game. We limit the analysis to stationary Markov perfect equilibria (SMPE). Given the structure of our in…nite-horizon model, time is not part of the payo¤ relevant state so that it seems natural to focus on stationary strategies that do not depend on calendar time (see Maskin and Tirole [19] ). Moreover, given the economics of the model, the state of technology at the end of the previous period Q t 1 is the appropriate state variable since current payo¤s (and therefore current actions) depend crucially on the inherited level of technology.
Accordingly:
De…nition 1 (Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium) The Markov strategies
form a Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE) if and only if:
(i) for all Q t 1 and all t ( ) and z t ( ), v (Q t 1 ; t ( ); z t ( )) is a solution to:
(ii) for all Q t 1 and t ( ):
for any b z t 6 = z t ; where v and b v are best response actions to z and b z respectively.
(iii) for all Q t 1 :
for any t 6 = t , where z ; v and z; v are best response actions to and respectively:
We are now ready to characterize the SPME of our dynamic game. Before stating our main proposition, let us de…ne a threshold level of the technological jump:
which will be crucial for our next result. Then, we can write the following: 1 8 Notice that, from an economic point of view, the only feature that distinguishes the two politicians in the eyes of the voters is the potential connection with the operating …rm. If this connection is absent, the two politicians would necessarily deliver the same economic outcome.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium)
The SMPE exists, is unique and entails constant actions.
Speci…cally, there exists > 1 independent of Q such that:
] the only SMPE is ( ; N ), where:
(1 )( 1)
> and the incumbent politician is re-elected with probability one.
(ii) if > min[ 1 ; ], the only SMPE is (1; I) and the incumbent politician is re-elected with probability :
As this Proposition shows, the economy can follow two equilibrium trajectories. In the …rst one, red-tape costs are high, the incumbent politician is always in power, and technology is never upgraded as the incumbent …rm exploits the network with the politician.
In the second one, red-tape costs are lowest, the incumbent is re-elected with a probability smaller than one, and technology is upgraded in every period.
In the …rst equilibrium (henceforth called "bad"), the politician deliberately chooses to maintain a high level of bureaucratic costs to maximize the probability of being reelected, thus creating an incumbency advantage, at the cost of economic stagnation. When the politician sets > , the incumbent monopolist …nds it pro…table to exploit the network thereby preventing entry of technologically advanced competitors. In turn, voters (workers) con…rm the incumbent politician and bene…t from lower prices generated by the cost reduction enjoyed by the connected …rm. In the second equilibrium (henceforth called "good"), the politician does not introduce bureaucratic distortions ( = 1) as she …nds it worthwhile to maximize growth despite the lower chances of being re-elected. As already discussed, the good equilibrium represents the …rst best of our economy, where aggregate income is maximized: the deviation from the …rst best is ultimately due to the re-election strategy of the politician.
Several comments are in order here. First, the Proposition highlights the crucial role of two threshold levels, 1 and . The former is related to the indi¤erence condition of voters between choosing the incumbent and supporting the status quo or electing the opponent and breaking the network. Note that, for the bad equilibrium to be sustained, the subjective discount factor of voters must be su¢ ciently low so that the short-run bene…t of the network outweighs the long-run cost of stagnation. In other words, voters cannot be excessively forward-looking. 19 The latter threshold is instead related to the indi¤erence condition of the incumbent politician between setting and maximize probability of re-election or implementing the …rst best and the high-growth path.
Whenever is lower than both thresholds, voters and politician are better o¤ in the bad equilibrium which is, in this case, the only SMPE of the game. However, as soon as is larger than either of the two thresholds, the good equilibrium emerges. Speci…cally, if < < 1 , the good equilibrium emerges as the politician does not …nd it worthwhile to set high red-tape costs although the voters would support them. If 1 < < the good equilibrium emerges as the voters would vote against an incumbent who set high costs.
Second, our model allows us to fully characterize the level of distortion that emerges in the "bad" equilibrium as a function of the structural parameters of the economy. This turns out to be the minimum level necessary to induce the incumbent …rm to invest in the network so that re-election is achieved at the minimum cost in terms of welfare. Third, as we discussed in the Introduction, it is worthwhile to emphasize again that our "bad" equilibrium is voluntarily supported by voters: once the politician has opted for a high level of red-tape costs, and the …rm has not invested in innovation, it is optimal for voters to con…rm the incumbent. In this case, the status quo is unanimously preferred by all agents and therefore particularly hard to break up.
To conclude this section, let us discuss how the equilibrium outcome depends on the main parameters of our model, and in particular on parameters related to economic competition and electoral results. By simple inspection of it is easy to verify that higher (that is, lower economic competition) implies higher : The intuition is pretty simple.
The higher is the expected return from innovation for the incumbent …rm (which depends positively on ), the higher is the network advantage 1 that the …rm must enjoy to be induced to invest in networking rather than innovation. We can also prove (see the Appendix) that higher implies lower so that the good equilibrium becomes more likely to emerge. 20 As the politician takes into account the higher welfare loss that has to be imposed on the society to induce the …rm to invest in networking, she will be willing to set higher red-tape costs and prevent innovation only if the increase in aggregate income associated to technological upgrade is lower. Turning to elections, if responsiveness of voters to economic policies decreases (that is, increases) the electoral gain of the network 1 9 Note that < 1 can be written as 1=(1 + 1 ) where 1 is the rate of growth of wages in the "good" equilibrium. A necessary condition for the latter to hold is that 1 < 1; which ensures that the discounted utility of workers in the good equilibrium is bounded. 2 0 Clearly, as increases, the set of such that > enlarges when < 1 . In the opposite case, changes in have no e¤ect on the set of for which either equilibrium can occur.
for the incumbent politician decreases and she will be more willing to lower bureaucratic costs and reform the ine¢ cient state. Again, decreases and the good equilibrium is more likely to occur.
To summarize, we can write the following:
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics) The good equilibrium is more (less) likely to emerge the higher (lower) is and the higher (lower) is .
Proof. See the Appendix. where the politician responds only to …rms' interests and is not constrained by voters' actions.
Conclusions
Excessive regulatory and administrative burdens due to cumbersome regulatory and administrative requirements and/or ine¢ cient bureaucracy are often pointed out as a major hindrance to growth as they subtract resources to investment and innovation and might represent a barrier to entry for new …rms and superior technologies.
In this paper, we consider red-tape as a production cost for …rms that can be mitigated through political connections in a relationship-based system ("knowing the right person in the right place"). As establishing connections requires time but no extra resources, connected …rms face lower marginal costs than potential competitors. Thus, incumbent …rms may be able to prevent entry of competitors with superior technology if they can exploit their political connections, that is, if politicians do not change too frequently. For the society as a whole, this creates a trade-o¤ between the short-run bene…ts of enjoying low production prices by keeping the status quo and the long-run costs of retarding and preventing technological upgrade.
Our model shows that the interaction between politicians, …rms and voters generates political equilibria that involve either perpetual innovation and replacement of the incumbent politician or stagnation and political persistence. By keeping an ine¢ cient bureaucracy, the incumbent politician can induce the incumbent …rm to spend time in establishing connections with the politician (which help to deal with bureaucracy, a sort of "learning-by-knowing") rather than innovating. As a result, voters may support the incumbent politician and the status quo to enjoy the lower production prices delivered by the connected …rm. In this stagnation trap, a unanimous socioeconomic block emerges, which prevents the adoption of new technologies and leads to economic backwardness.
Ceteris paribus, when facing similar technological opportunities (same ), countries are more likely to end up in the stagnation trap the more responsive to economic policies are voters (lower ) and the lower is the probability of success for the incumbent …rm when it invests in innovation (lower ). However, the welfare loss associated to stagnation is lower (lower ) for lower .
The results of our model are consistent with a negative association between political persistence and economic growth in presence of high red-tape costs that we documented in the …rst part of the paper. In the bad equilibrium, a change in the politician in o¢ ce breaks the network between politicians and …rms and ensures that an outside …rm endowed with the leading-edge technology enters the market. In this case, there is technological upgrade and high growth. In the good equilibrium, technological upgrade occurs regardless of electoral results: even if the incumbent wins the elections, an e¢ cient bureaucracy guarantees that the quality leader enters the market.
Our theoretical analysis could be extended in di¤erent ways. First, we could extend the analysis of voters' behavior, in order to provide a fully- ‡edged probabilistic voting model (along the lines of Persson and Tabellini [20] , ch. 3) which could allow us to enlarge the set of structural parameters of our model and to incorporate additional politicaleconomy issues. Second, an overlapping-generations version of our model could highlight interesting political and economic con ‡icts between short-sighted and long-sighted agents, which would give rise to intergenerational con ‡icts between the young (more inclined to political turnover and economic change) and the old (supporting the status quo). We Suppose that individual worker i has the following preferences:
when politician P 2 fI; Og is elected and the policy is implemented (by the incumbent politician at the beginning of the period).
The term e i (P ) captures the non-economic related bene…ts that individual i enjoys if politician P is elected (for instance, related to ideology). Let us normalize e i (I) = 0
so that e i > 0 implies that individual i has a bias in favor of politician O while e i = 0 denotes an ideologically neutral voter. Moreover, let us assume that e i = Individual i prefers politician I if
where e = Q 1 measures the average relative popularity of O in the population. Assume that has a uniform distribution on
It can be easily veri…ed that the total vote share for the incumbent is given by:
where e =
: The probability that the incumbent is elected is therefore given by:
Note whenever u( I ) = u( O ) (as for instance in the good equilibrium where = 1), the probability that the incumbent is re-elected is
which is larger (smaller) than 1/2 if (a + b) is smaller (larger) than 0. If instead the incumbent sets > 1, we have
which is positive whenever < 1 . Clearly, in this case, is decreasing with . For the sake of simplicity, in our model we assume that for any = ; = 1, that is equivalent to assume: "
A2. Proof of Remark 1
Equation (3) can be written as:
Comparing this expression with equation (5), it can be easily noted that the latter is larger
A3. Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof is divided into three parts. First, we show that there are only two possible equilibria, characterized by constant actions of all players. Second, we show that the equilibrium exists and is unique for given con…gurations of parameters. 1) (i) Any equilibrium strategy pro…le must have z t = I when t = 1: Given t = 1, best response for …rm is to play I. (ii) Any equilibrium strategy pro…le must have z t = N when t > 1: If the strategy pro…le of the …rm had z t = I when t > 1; then the politician would be better o¤ by deviating and playing 1 to which the …rm would respond by playing I (see i). There is no incentive for the politician to keep high red tape costs when the …rm is not investing in networking. When the incumbent …rm invests in innovation, voters are indi¤erent between the two politicians, the probability of being re-elected is and cannot be a¤ected by an increase in : (iii) Any equilibrium strategy pro…le must have v t = M when z t = N: If the strategy pro…le of the voters had v t = R when z t = N , then the …rm would be better of by deviating and playing I as the network would be broken anyway.
In this case, there is no reason for the …rm to invest in networking as there is no network advantage. (iv) We are left with equilibrium strategies pro…les that yield either ( t ; N; M ) or (1; I) and voters con…rm the incumbent with probability , 8t 0. (v) Suppose that at time t the politician chooses t > 1. Then, we know that players'actions are given by ( t ; N; M ) and Q does not change. By stationarity, from time t onwards players will always play ( t ; N; M ). (vi) Suppose instead that at time t the politician chooses t = 1. Then, players'actions are given by (1; I) and the incumbent wins elections with probability .
In period t + 1; Q has changed and two possibilities arise. Either the politician chooses t+1 > 1 and actions are given by ( t+1 ; N; M ) or she chooses t = 1 and actions are given by (1; I). The …rst possibility cannot be an equilibrium action as it would imply:
where Y L t denotes the low level of aggregate income in period t when = t+1 and Y H t denotes the high level of aggregate income in period t when = 1. The …rst inequality follows from 1 being preferred to t+1 in period t. The second follows from t+1 being
the two inequalities cannot hold together. Thus, if equilibrium actions are (1; I) in period t it must also be the case that equilibrium actions are (1; I) in period t + 1 and in all subsequent periods. In all periods the incumbent will be re-elected with probability .
2) Consider the following Markov strategy pro…le for the voters, the …rm and the politician: v (Q; ; N j > 1) = M; z (Q; j ) = N; z (Q; j < ) = I , and (Q) = . Moreover, recall that, whenever voters are indi¤erent between the economic outcomes delivered by the two politicians (that is, whenever z = I and/or = 1), we assumed that they will vote for the incumbent with probability . To prove that these are
Markov equilibrium strategies, we apply the one-stage deviation principle. (i) For voters not to deviate when politician plays and …rm plays N it must be true that:
where Q 0 = Q + 1, w R is the wage rate when the voters choose the opponent and a new unconnected entrant with high production costs replaces the incumbent …rm, and w M is the wage rate when the voters choose the incumbent and the connected …rm produces at low production costs. The LHS represents voters'utility if they vote for the opponent in period t and then vote for the incumbent for all subsequent period. The RHS represents voters'utility if they vote for the incumbent in all periods. After some algebra the latter inequality reduces to:
The left-hand side represents the ratio w M =w R : Given ; this term measures the static e¢ ciency gain from the network. The right-hand side represents the dynamic loss of the network, related to the blocking of innovation that leads to stagnant wages and income. If the latter inequality does not hold, workers would value the long-run gain of technological upgrades more than the short-run bene…t of reducing production costs through the political network. Inequality (21) can be easily rewritten as:
(ii) Consider now the …rm. The …rm would not deviate by playing I when the politician sets if and only if: "
where N is the pro…t when the …rm invests in networking and I is the pro…t when the …rm invests in innovation. The LHS represents …rm's utility if it invests in innovation in period t (and survives with probability ) and invests in networking in all subsequent periods. The RHS represents …rm's utility if it invests in networking in all periods. After some algebra, the above inequality can be rewritten as:
To prove that > it is su¢ cient to show that
We will prove that this inequality holds for all 1 (which is a necessary condition for the bad equilibrium to exist). Recall that 1 1 > 0 by previous assumption (see footnote 21) , so that the above inequality can be written as:
The second term on the RHS is strictly concave and positive for < 
where Y H (Q; 1) is the high level of income when = 1 and there is innovation (given by eq. 3 with = 1) and Y L (Q; ) is the low level of income when = and innovation is blocked (given by eq. 5 with = ). The latter inequality can be rewritten as:
Notice that: on Q so that also cannot depend on Q: It remains to show that no other deviation can be pro…table for the politician. Clearly, the politician would not set > as there would be no electoral gain but only an e¢ ciency loss. Finally, any 2 (1; ) is dominated by = 1 as the network would be broken in any case, the probability of re-election would be and the politician would be better o¤ by minimizing the distortionary costs.
A4. Proof of Proposition 2. If increases, the RHS of (28) decreases and decreases.
A5. Proof of the existence of b :
Descriptive Statistics Tables A and B 
